We present the analysis of the mathematical structure that is inherent in non-signalling theories from the point of view of so-called quantum logics. This establishes a new link between quantum information theory and well developed theory of quantum logics. Propositional system of an example of non-signalling theories is derived and its structure is analyzed. In particular we discuss the subtle relation to classical and quantum theories. Finally the origin of discussed example is elucidated from the point of view of mathematical structure.
Introduction
From 1930s people tried to understand the foundations of the quantum mechanics. Two main pillars of these attempts are: algebraic approach that originated from the work of Jordan, von Neumann and Wigner [1] and quantum logics approach originated from von Neumann and Birkhoff [2] . These two ideas got the mature form in famous books of Emch about algebraic approach [3] and Piron about quantum logics [4] . In both cases quantum mechanics is derived from the axioms that simply encode plausible physical intuitions. Of course what is plausible depends on a taste.
Although both these approaches lead to Hilbert space quantum mechanics, they are not equivalent. Algebraic approach is a good starting point to rigorous treatment of quantum statistical mechanics and quantum field theory. This is not possible in quantum logics. On the other hand because logics is closely related to Kolmogorov's probability theory, quantum logics is better suited for discussing probability and its generalizations and in fact quantum logics evolved in the direction beyond classical and quantum probability, see e.g. [5] , [6] or [7] for a nice review.
Recently the theory of so-called non-signaling boxes, or Box World theories, brought a lot of attention in the information processing theory (see e.g. [8] , [9] , [10] ). The idea originated from Popescu and Rorlih [11] , as a realization of the theory that violates 2 2 bound of CHSH theory.
The problem of violating this bound was previously discussed in the algebraic setting by Landau in [12, 13] . In the very general setting of Segal's axiomatization [14] he shows that violation of Tsirelson bound implies non-distributivity of algebra of observables. But the only known examples of non-distributive Segal's algebras [15] are not suitable for description of two casually separated systems. Thus in algebraic setting it seems that the relativistic causality is enough to single out quantum mechanics among other reasonable theories. The only possible exception could be provided by some yet unknown non-distributive Segal algebras.
On the other hand, the so-called non-signaling principle is claimed to be counterpart of relativistic causality in information processing theories, and non-signaling boxes satisfy it by definition. This suggests that detailed examination of the mathematical structure of non-signaling theories might be interesting and reveal some new strange features of this theory (in heuristic correspondence to peculiarity of non-distributive Segal's algebras).
Probability and logics
We remind the in the beginning of the XX century probability was considered as a part of physics (cf. the list of Hilbert problems). In line with this point of view we will hold on strongly to physical picture. The aim of this section is to bring a concise review of a standard approach to this topic. For more detailed exposition see e.g. Refs. [16] , [17] and [4] .
Consider basic example from classical physics: an N free particles. We will denote the phase space of the system by Γ. The state of this physical system is obviously completely described by giving position and momentum of all particles, i.e. by a point in Γ. But in general we need to take into account the fact that we know these values inaccurately. In that case we would like the state to be described by some measure on a phase space. This measure reflects our knowledge. Precisely we think about a map µ: Σ → , where Σ is σ-algebra of subsets of phase space (in our case Borel sets), satisfying following properties
We additionally demand that µ(Γ) = 1. Then if E is some subset of Γ we would interpret µ(E) as a probability of finding our particles with positions and momentums belonging to E. Equivalently we can think of it as a chance of getting answer "yes" if we ask the following question "Does particles have a positions and momentums belonging to E". But this is in fact experimental question, a socalled proposition 1 -we could build a device that would realize such experiment. We denote this question shortly by q E and the set of all such questions by . The probability of answer "yes" we will denote by m µ (q E ) := µ(E). Now we focus on the structure of this set. We immediately notice that some of those questions are related. For example let F ⊂ E ⊂ Γ and let the system be in a state that always give answer "yes" for a question q F , then it would also always give answer "yes" for a question q E . So the question q E in some sense "contains" question q F .
To be more precise, we define a partial order relation in the set of all questions . For any q, p ∈ we define q ≤ p whenever for all possible states (i.e. probability measures) we have m µ (q) ≤ m µ (p). In our case this gives the same order as as partial order on Σ induced by the set inclusion. By q ∨ p we denote the least question that majorizes q and p and by q ∧ p the greatest question that is less than q and p. For our system these correspond to set union and intersection of subsets of phase space.
Along the question q we can always operationally consider opposite question defined by interchanging answers. We will denote it by q c . If q ≤ p c then we say that the questions q and p are disjoint. They can never be simultaneously true. For our N-particle system this corresponds to the set disjointness of phase space subsets.
Having two disjoint questions it is possible to construct a sum p ⊕ q of these questions, defined by
It is obvious that the sum corresponds to p ∨ q (but the sum is not defined for all pairs). Finally one can consider the two trivial questions: one which gives always "yes" and we denote it by ½ and the one that gives always "no", denoted by 0 = ½ c .
Now it is quite straightforward to show that the set is in fact an orthomodular lattice. Let us recall the definition:
is called a lattice if any two elements have unique least upper bound, called join and denoted by ∨, and unique greatest lower bound, called meet and denoted by ∧.
We say that the lattice (poset) is bounded if it has greatest element denoted by ½ and the lowest element, denoted by 0.
An element q ∈ of lattice (poset) is said to cover p ∈ if for any r ∈ we have that q ≥ r ≥ p =⇒ r = p or r = q. Elements that cover 0 are called atoms.
A Finally, we say that the lattice (poset) is orthomodular if it is orthocomplemented and
In fact our is a Boolean algebra, i.e. it additionally satisfies distributivity law:
This fact allows us to interpret join and meet in terms of logical "or" and "and", i.e. p ∨ q is exactly the question "p or q" and p ∧ q is a question "q and p".
Definition 2
Let be an orthocomplemented lattice. Function µ:
It is worth to emphasize that for any probability space (Ω, Σ, µ) the σ-algebra Σ of subsets of Ω is an Boolean algebra (with respect to set operations) and to any probability measure µ there correspond probability measure on the Boolean algebra Σ. Conversely for any abstract Boolean algebra one can construct set Ω, σ-algebra Σ of subsets of Ω and probability measure on Ω corresponding to any probability measure on Boolean algebra. In that sense Boolean algebra structure is equivalent to the Kolmogorov's axioms.
Consequently, for any classical physical system we can construct a Boolean structure associated with it. We call it a logics of classical physical system or classical propositional system. This structure describes the system completely, i.e. we could reconstruct all physical predictions from the logics of the system. It is very intuitive as it means that we can completely describe the system by specifying all possible questions that we can ask.
The same thing can be done in the case of quantum mechanics. Although there is no phase space we know how to describe all possible questions. Any such question is a dichotomic observable represented by an orthogonal projector. The order structure in the set of all projectors is induced by the Hilbert subspace inclusion relation. The complement of a projector p is simply projector onto orthocomplemented subspace, i.e. ½ − p.
Again, it is straightforward to check that the set of all orthogonal projectors on Hilbert space forms an orthomodular lattice, which fails to be distributive (thus is not Boolean). We call it logics of quantum physical system or quantum propositional system. This is the simplest and very natural generalization of classical propositional system. Physical states, both pure and mixed, define probability measures on the lattice. Observables that are more complex than simple "yes-no" can be described as a lattice-valued measures by the spectral theorem. Finally one can show that the logics of quantum system (with additional few plausible assumptions) fully describes quantum system (for a detailed exposition see [4] ).
By the analogy to classical case, it is widely agreed to treat orthomodular lattice structure as an axiomatic definition of quantum probability. From the point of view of lattice theory it is the most natural generalization of classical, i.e. Kolmogorov's probability.
Propositional system of the Box World
Now we construct propositional system of a Box World exemplary system, i.e. the system described in [9] . For the purpose of this paper we will refer to it as Box World One.
The Box World One is a two-composite system and each of the components have two dichotomic observables. We denote them by {x, y} and assume that possible values are {0, 1} (it could be arbitrary two element set). The word x y means that we measure x on the first subsystem and y on the second. We adopt analogous convention for outcomes. All other measurements that can be performed on the Box World One are sequences or convex combinations of these elementary (fiducial) observables (according to the Definition 1 and Theorem 2 in [9] ). Finally, according to the "Box World theory" [9] , any function
P3 non-signaling condition: β∈{0,1} P(αβ |a b) = β∈{0,1} P(αβ |ac), ∀α ∈ {0, 1} and ∀a, b, c ∈ {x, y}.
defines an allowed state. We interpret the value of P(αβ |a b) as a probability of getting outcomes α and β when measuring a and b. The name of the third condition comes from intuition that it should encode Einstein's causality principle. Of course it can not rigorously correspond to it because the Box World theory does not define a space-time in its formalism. Now we are going to define logics of the Box World One. We start from elementary questions. We can easily define them, because Box World One is finite (in number of fiducial observables) and discrete (in their outcomes) system. Our construction is analogous to construction of logics of quantum system in Mackey's book [16] . We would like to emphasize that we do not add anything to Box World One. We only explore the structure that is already in it.
As a first step we adopt a different, more flexible, notation. By p (a, b), ρ, (α, β ) we denote probability of obtaining result α, β when measuring a, b in the state ρ, i.e. P ρ (αβ |a b) in typically used notation (e.g. in [9] ). By [a b, αβ ] we will denote an experimental question: "does measuring a on the first subsystem and b on the second yield the result α on the first subsystem and β on the second". The probability of answer "yes" (value 1) is then given by
If p([a b, αβ ], ρ, 1) = 1 in some state, then we say that this question is true or certain in that state. One easily verifies that p (a, b), ρ, · is a good (discrete) probability measure on {0, 1} × {0, 1} and thus p([a b, αβ ], ρ, ·) is a good probability measure on {0, 1}. When it is convenient we will denote
It is reasonable to identify two observables if for all states they always give the same probability measure on outcomes. Analogously if two states for all observables give the same probability measure on outcomes then we assume that these states are the same. It simply express the fact that different observables as well as different states are distinguished from each other by measurements.
Now we define partial ordering on questions. We say that
. It is straightforward to check that this is indeed a partial ordering and this construction is consistent with partial order of questions from previous section. Apart from questions defined so far, we can always ask a trivial question, that will always give answer "yes" and its complementary null question, that always give answer "no".
By the definition and properties of Box World theory (again we recall mentioned in the first paragraph Definition 1 and Theorem 2 in [9] ), questions in the set 
If for some fixed pair of questions q = [a b, αβ ] and r = [cd, γδ] we have
or equivalently q ≤ r c then q and r cannot both be true in any state. This allows us to assume that we can ask a question: "does q or r give yes?". We denote this question by q ⊕ r and define it by
We could proceed without this assumption, but from operational point of view it is well justified, what seems to be in line with general idea of Box World Theory. Moreover this construction is essential to identify questions that correspond to measurements on single subsystem. Operation ⊕ is associative. Using these two recipes we generate other possible questions in Box World One. We will get finite number of questions due to discrete and finite character of Box World One. For any question p for sure p c is a well defined question. In order to find pairs p, q ∈ a which satisfy p ≤ q c we need to maximize lhs of (4) with respect to ρ. To solve this problem, let us firstly fix notation. The state in Box World can be characterized by giving a matrix of probabilities. In our notation we call this matrix ρ. 
P(00|x x) P(00|x y) P(00| y x) P(00| y y) P(01|x x) P(01|x y) P(01| y x) P(01| y y) P(10|x x) P(10|x y) P(10| y x) P(10| y y) P(11|x x) P(11|x y) P(11| y x) P(11| y y)
Normalization conditions are given by
Positivity means that ρ i j ≥ 0. Thus for any pair of questions p, q problem of maximizing lhs of (4) is a linear programming problem, which can be easily solved. Now we recursively repeat the following procedure starting with = a ∪ {0, ½} until the result no longer change.
(1) set c = {q c ; q ∈ }, Using linear programming again, we can check whether r ≤ q, or q ≤ r, for any r, q ∈
We get that neither of elementary questions in a are greater than other and thus elements of a are unrelated in the defined order. All of them are obviously greater than null question. We conclude that a is a set of atoms for logics of Box World One. The whole set is obviously, by construction, a partially ordered set. It is in fact bounded poset as it has greatest and least element. 1] on second subsystem, etc. Using the whole generated propositional system we immediately conclude that orthomodular poset generated by y 1 and y 2 is in fact Boolean algebra, i.e. y 1 and y 2 are compatible questions. This is exactly what we expect from the question that belong to casually separated systems.
On the other hand questions 11] and y 1 generate orthomodular poset which fails to be Boolean algebra. Consequently these question are not compatible, which again is what we expected. We turn to this point once more in Sec. 5.
Finally, in [18] a nice algebraic structure is derived for any orthomodular poset that has unique conditional probability, thus it is natural to ask if Box World One has this feature. Let ρ be a state and q such question that p(q, ρ) > 0. We recall [18] that that a state ρ q is called a conditional probability of state ρ under question q if for any r ≤ q, p(r, ρ q ) = p(r, ρ)/p(q, ρ). Then an orthomodular poset is an UCP space [18] whenever for each state ρ and question q ∈ such that p(q, ρ) > 0 there exists one and only one conditional probability ρ q of ρ under q (note that in Niestegge [18] considers more general structure thus provides slightly more general definition). 
Proposition 3 Propositional system of Box World

Box World One vs. two qubit system
Result from previous section elucidate why Tsirelson bound is violated in the Box World. The classical bound of 2 is violated when the Boolean structure of classical probability is replaced by the orthomodular lattice, i.e. the structure behind the quantum probability. Similar qualitative difference is not surprising when this structure is replaced by more general one, the orthomodular poset (although the Author is not aware of any prior results of this type in the context of quantum logics). Despite the obvious fact that orthomodular poset is a more general object than orthomodular lattice, simple statement that Box World One is a generalization of some quantum model (e.g. two qubits) is not justified.
The essential difference between these two is that logics of even the simplest quantum model has infinite number of questions, while in Box World One we have only 82 of them. Thus we can not claim that the quantum mechanics is a special case of theory of non-signaling boxes, even if we are interested only in two-qubit systems (i.e. we neglect Heisenberg commutation relations and consequently infinite dimensional Hilbert spaces). To see how important for the logical structure the number of questions is let us consider following example.
Consider two qubit system, described by H = 2 ⊗ 2 . Let P ⊗ ½,Q ⊗ ½ ∈ B(H) be pair of noncommuting projectors. They can represent measurement of polarization along non-perpendicular directions on the first subsystem. Analogously choose two non-commuting projectors ½ ⊗ R, ½ ⊗ S that represent measurement on second subsystem. Now the join of P ⊗ S and Q ⊗ R exists and by definition is equal projector onto the smallest subspace that contains both images of P ⊗ S and Q ⊗ R. But this projector can not be expressed by a linear combination of projectors that we used so far.
In other words, if we denote projector 11] in quantum mechanics exists, but it is not a linear combination of [a b, αβ ]. On the other hand in Box World One any observable is a linear combination of elements in a , thus there is no equivalent of above quantum mechanical question. Consequently, in some sense more general structure of Box World One is a result of depleted set of questions when compared to quantum mechanics. We elaborate on this statement in the Sec. 6.
Restriction to classical case
Now we would like to analyze the logical structure of Box World One when we restrict to states that are convex combinations of following 16 Box World states:
These states correspond to so-called classically correlated boxes or local boxes [8] . We can repeat construction of the propositional system from the previous section with this restricted set of states.
It is quite amazing that we get exactly the same propositional system. Thus from the point of view of logics these are not "classical boxes" but indeed only "classically correlated boxes". It reflects the fact that these states were chosen in a such way that they do not violate CHSH-like inequalities, as analogous classical states do. But this is only one aspect of the theory. Let us examine the relation of classically correlated boxes to truly classical boxes, i.e. boxes that obey classical physics theory. In the classical theory the system is described by its phase space. For the system that can be fully described by two dichotomic observables the phase space is a set of four points. Finally phase space of compound system is a Cartesian product of phases spaces of components, thus the phase space of truly classical Box World One is an 16 element set. We can think of it as
where each 4-tuple represents values of four dichotomic observables in that point of Γ (i.e. pure state). Any probability measure on this set can be represented by the point within the 15-simplex:
It is important to note that any point of a simplex can be uniquely represented as a convex combination of extreme points. In other words mixed state "remembers" how it was made. This constitutes a remarkable property of classical theories.
To We can define a mapping ϕ from the simplex of classical states on Γ into the set of classically correlated states on Box World One. Using the matrix representation of Box World One states (6) one express it explicitly
where µ is a probability measure on Γ. It is easy to see that this map maps pure classical states onto extreme classically correlated states and thus is onto the set of classically correlated states, but it is not injective. As an example consider following two probability measures: Consequently this is not an affine isomorphism and the set of classically correlated states is not "classically shaped", as the image of ϕ is not a simplex. This means that classically correlated states do not decompose in unique way into the convex combination of extremal states. As a result the measurement in the Box World One must be destructive. Let us consider this in more detail.
Assume that we are given "sources" of different Box World One boxes and a device that allows mixing them. Denote by Now we set up our mixing device to output ρ 1 and ρ 2 with probability 1/2. Resulting state encoding our uncertainty would be ρ = 1/2ρ 1 +1/2ρ 2 . Now we ask [x x, 11] question. If the answer is "yes", then on the same boxes we ask [x y, 11]. Because we mixed states ρ 1 and ρ 2 , in classical world we should get answer "yes". But in Box World One we can obtain the same state ρ by mixing completely different states: 1/2ρ 3 + 1/2ρ 4 . In the latter case, for the second question we should always get answer "no". To overcome this ambiguity we must assume that either each box can be measured only once and then is destroyed, or that the box undergoes state transformation under measurement. Then we need to postulate how the state is changed (e.g. after positive answer to question [x y, a b] it transforms to uniform mixture of all extreme states in which [x y, a b] is certain).
This of course differs from fundamental property of classical systems that, although our measurements introduce some distortion to the system, we can, in principle, make this influence as small as we want. This is connected to the fact, that due to the same propositional system as in case of whole Box World One, there are incompatible questions, which on the other hand are obvious signs of non-classicality. which is understood in the following sense: propositional system is embedded into larger structure and states are extended to states on this larger structure. Similar construction can be performed for quantumly correlated states. Using the analogy discussed in sec. 4 → orthomodular lattice Intuition suggests that the answer to this question is negative because orthomodular lattice is a propositional system of quantum mechanics and due to violation of Tsirelson bound this embedding should not be possible. Nevertheless, author is not aware of any proof of Tsirelson bound that relies solely on the structure of orthomodular lattice. Moreover it is not a sensible assumption that any orthomodular lattice corresponds to some quantum model, but still any propositional system that is an orthomodular lattice posses nice physical interpretation (for details see [4] ).
Embedding Box World One into orthomodular lattice
Although the positive example to this question would be very interesting, we will show that the set of all states of the Box World One (in particular these that violate Tsirelson bound) is to rich to allow definition of unique joins for all questions.
Theorem 4 The logics of Box World One cannot be embedded into orthomodular lattice in a way that preserves all Box World One states.
Proof We will show this by contradiction. Let
The least upper bound of q 1 and q 2 consist of elements: Consequently it is not possible to define this unique join if we want to allow all Box World One states to extend to valid states on larger structure.
Conclusions
From this analysis following picture of the origin of Box World One emerges. We take the simplex of classical states over a 16-element phase space. Then using the map φ from Sec. 5 we map them onto the smaller set of classically correlated states of Box World One. This set of states induces certain orthomodular structure on the set of all possible questions , but these states are not all possible probability measures on . As a next step we enrich set of states with those probability measures on , that satisfy some plausible assumptions, specifically P1-P3. As a result we obtain an orthomodular poset with certain subset of all probability measures on it, rich enough to forbid embedding this structure into larger Boolean algebra or even orthomodular lattice. Due to the link between probability and partially ordered structures we obtained in this way a generalized probability theory. One of the features of this theory is violation of Tsirelson bound of quantum probability theory. We believe this work sheds new light on the nature of Box World One and gives some intuition on other non-signalling theories. This also suggests that other examples of generalized quantum logics studied in the literature can exhibit violation of Tsirelson bound. On the other hand it could be interesting to investigate in more detail properties of Box World One as an example of generalized quantum logics.
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